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The Role of Non-Eurozone Foreign Investors in the Eurozone Sovereign Bond Market: Current Composition, Data, and Impact

Introduction

The euro area bond market stands as one of the largest and most sophisticated sovereign debt markets in the world. Within this bloc, euro-denominated government bonds—"sovereign debt"—are not solely held by residents of Eurozone nations themselves. Instead, investors outside the Eurozone, both official and private, play a significant role in holding and trading these bonds. This report provides a comprehensive, factual account of the current situation regarding non-Eurozone (foreign) investor participation in the Eurozone sovereign debt market, focusing strictly on *present data and structure*, and drawing on the latest available primary sources, including official ECB publications, securities holding statistics, and contemporary analytical research. The discussion is purposefully limited to describing *current facts* and does not offer projections, sustainability analysis, or speculative trends.

I. The Eurozone Sovereign Bond Market: Current Structure and Holdings

1.1 Overview of Euro Area Government Debt and Market Size

As of mid-to-late 2025, the gross outstanding government debt of the 20 Eurozone countries (the "Euro area 20") stands at approximately EUR 13.7 trillion, which corresponds to roughly 88% of the Eurozone's GDP. The vast majority of this debt—over 83%—is held in the form of negotiable securities (bonds) denominated in euros, making the Eurozone a cornerstone of global fixed income markets. The depth, liquidity, and safety of euro-denominated government bonds attract diverse classes of investors not only from inside but also from outside the Euro area.

1.2 Key Holder Segments of Eurozone Sovereign Debt

The composition of holders of Eurozone sovereign bonds is

multifaceted, commonly divided into:

- Domestic investors (resident financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, households, and non-profits),
- Eurozone institutional central banks (Eurosystème: European Central Bank and national central banks),
- Other Euro area country residents (cross-country Eurozone investments),
- **Non-Eurozone foreign investors** (investors outside both the issuing country and the monetary union—the focus of this report).

The structure is kept intentionally simple here but, in practice, overlaps and indirect holdings via funds and custodians can create statistical complexities.

II. The Current Share and Composition of Non-Eurozone Foreign Investors

2.1 Aggregate Share: Fact-Based Estimates

Current best estimates place the share of Eurozone government debt held by non-Eurozone (foreign) investors at approximately 23%–25% of the total outstanding portfolio as of late 2024 or early 2025, equivalent to about EUR 2.6–2.7 trillion. These figures are corroborated by ECB Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS), International Investment Position (IIP) data, and the Eurosystem’s own quarterly sectoral accounts.

This share had previously declined during the peak years of the ECB’s large-scale asset purchase programmes (2015–2022), when the Eurosystem’s proportion of outstanding bonds increased rapidly, but has rebounded since net asset purchases ended in mid-2022 and yields rose, attracting renewed global inflows.

Table 1: Current Allocation of Euro Area Government Debt Holdings (Q4 2024)

Investor Group	EUR billion	% of Total Outstanding
Non-Eurozone (foreign) investors	2,674	23.9%
- of which, foreign official sector	952	8.5%
Eurozone resident financial institutions (banks, pension funds, insurers, investment funds)	4,800– 5,000	~43–45%
Eurosystem (ECB & NCBs)	3,750	27–28%
Households and non-profits	450	4%
Other/uncategorized	~120	<1%
Total	~11,200	100%

Source: ECB SHS, IIP, Bundesbank, own calculations.

Note: Aggregates are not exact due to overlapping methodologies. Figures rounded for clarity.

Table Elaboration

This allocation highlights that **roughly one out of every four euros of Eurozone government debt is currently held outside the Euro area**, with the majority of these foreign holdings comprising investment funds, central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and institutional investors from advanced economies both within Europe (but outside the Euro area) and globally.

2.2 Eurozone's International Investment Position and Regional Patterns of Foreign Holdings

The Eurozone's international investment position (IIP) statistics provide additional confirmation. As of Q4 2024, the net position for euro-denominated general government debt indicates some EUR 2.6 trillion is held by non-residents, virtually identical to detailed SHS data.

Foreign holders of euro area government debt are heavily concentrated in advanced economies aligned geopolitically with the "West" (North America, UK, Switzerland, Asian advanced economies), along with select sovereign wealth funds from non-aligned countries. The data show the following breakdown:

- **Around 70% of foreign holdings originate from geopolitically aligned countries** (primarily the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Singapore).
- Non-aligned countries (Middle East, China, others) and connector economies account for most of the remainder, with a small share for offshore financial centres.

2.3 By Issuer Country Within the Eurozone

The proportion of foreign holdings varies notably by sovereign issuer:

- For **France**, over 45% of central government debt is held by non-residents, one of the highest ratios among large Eurozone economies.
- **Germany** also maintains a significant ratio, with about 40% held by foreigners.
- **Italy and Spain**: The non-resident share is lower, in the range of 20%–32%, reflecting a stronger role for domestic banks and households.
- For smaller Eurozone countries, the non-resident share may be even higher (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland).

Table 2: Non-Resident Holdings of Core Eurozone Sovereign Debt (“Big 4” Issuers, End 2023)

Country % Held by Non-Residents (excl. Eurosystem)

Germany ~40%

France ~46%

Italy ~20%

Spain ~32%

Source: Bundesbank, ECB, SHS, Q4 2023

The dominance of non-resident holdings for highly rated issuers like France and Germany is consistent with the global perception of their bonds as safe liquid assets, widely used as benchmarks and reserves.

2.4 Official Sector Versus Private Sector Foreign Holdings

The foreign investor base can be separated into **official sector holders** (central banks, sovereign wealth funds, international organizations) and **private sector holders** (institutional funds, asset managers, private banks, hedge funds).

- As of Q4 2024, **foreign official sector holdings of euro area government debt accounted for around EUR 950 billion**, representing roughly **8.5% of outstanding debt**, and **over 35% of all non-resident holdings**.
- Private sector foreign holders, such as investment funds, asset managers, and banks, account for the remaining majority of non-resident holdings.

The **official sector component is predominantly driven by central bank foreign reserves and sovereign wealth fund allocations**, mainly from countries seeking portfolio diversification or fulfilling foreign reserve management mandates. These holdings are typically stable and less sensitive to yield changes.

2.5 Geographic and Institutional Concentration

Foreign holdings of euro area sovereign debt are distributed globally but tend to be concentrated among a relatively small group of major investing countries and institutional types. The United States, United Kingdom (often through custodial or fund structures), Switzerland, Japan, and countries with large managed reserves or deep investment fund sectors (Singapore, Norway, Canada, Middle East), account for a major share. Within the European Union, non-euro members such as Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, and others are also present as holders.

2.6 Channel Structures and Custodial Biases

Holdings statistics rely primarily on data from securities custodians. In the Eurozone, the ECB's Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS) and International Investment Position (IIP) data, along with the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment

Survey (CPIS), capture these flows.

- **Custodial bias:** Statistics can misattribute the ultimate investor when securities are held through global custodians (e.g., Euroclear in Belgium, Clearstream in Luxembourg, or London-based custodians), as the geographic reporting follows the location of the custodian, not the beneficial owner.
- **Investment fund bias:** A significant proportion of euro area sovereign bonds held by foreigners are ultimately owned by global investors via funds domiciled in the EU (especially Luxembourg and Ireland), giving rise to statistical uncertainty about the true country of the end-holder. Security-by-security "drill-downs" suggest that for some funds, only a third to a quarter of the underlying investors are euro area residents; the rest are genuinely foreign owners.

The best current estimates, after attempting to "look through" fund and custodial chains, generally confirm the aggregate share of foreign holdings, but emphasize that the actual ultimate investor base is likely even broader than headline country statistics suggest.

III. Data Sources, Methodologies, and Limitations

3.1 Principal Statistical Sources

The leading statistical tools underpinning the measurement of non-resident holdings are:

- **ECB Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS and SHSS):** Provide security-by-security (ISIN-linked) granular data on who holds what, by sector and geography, with quarterly updates.
- **International Investment Position (IIP):** Presents aggregate stock (and flow) data on all cross-border assets and liabilities, including by debt instrument and by major partner country.

National Central Bank and Treasury Reports: (e.g., Bundesbank Monthly Report; Banque de France studies)

- give fine-grained country-level breakdowns by creditor sector and, sometimes, by nationality or region.
- **IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS):** International survey giving estimates of cross-border securities holdings by country, but subject to incomplete "look-through" of custodial relationships.

3.2 Quality, Coverage, and Biases

The coverage of these sources is generally robust but subject to three major issues:

- **Custodial Bias:** Misattribution of non-resident holdings when securities are held through financial centers (UK, US, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland), leading to overstatement of those centers and understatement of true end-investor country.
- **Fund Industry Bias:** Especially in Luxembourg and Ireland, a large share of investment funds are owned by investors in third countries; counting the fund country (Lux, IE) as the investor country overstates holdings by those countries.
- **Incomplete Chain-of-Ownership Data:** Statistics may not fully capture beneficial ownership after multiple layers of intermediation—especially when non-EU funds or custodians are used, causing potential double-counting or misclassification.

Efforts including fund "unwind" methodologies (which allocate fund assets to the ultimate beneficial owner by security type and investor residence) have been developed to partially overcome these limitations and are now regularly used by ECB staff and research teams.

IV. Effects of Foreign Holdings on Eurozone Sovereign Debt Structure

4.1 Diversification, Liquidity, and Market Function

Foreign investors are crucial in providing diversification to the Eurozone sovereign debt investor base. Their participation enhances market liquidity, supports efficient

- pricing, and underpins the role of euro area government bonds as benchmark assets globally.
- **Large, stable foreign holdings help anchor demand for euro-denominated assets**, reinforcing the euro's status as a global reserve and investment currency (second only to the US dollar by market volume and use in reserves).

4.2 Foreign Official Sector: Safe Asset Demand

A significant portion of foreign holdings is by sovereign and central bank reserve managers, indicating that euro area government bonds (primarily Bunds, OATs, and Dutch or other AAA/AA-rated issues) are considered high-grade, liquid assets for inclusion in official reserves.

- This is reflected in the **8%–9% of outstanding government debt held by foreign official sector entities or about EUR 950 billion**, as noted above.
- This demand for safety and liquidity, especially from non-aligned reserve managers, has shown resilience even through recent geopolitical shocks, such as Russia's exclusion from capital markets post-2022.

4.3 Regional Asymmetry in Foreign Holdings

The structure of foreign participation is not evenly distributed across the sovereigns:

- **France and Germany:** A much higher share of their debt is held abroad, reflecting their recognized status as “safe assets” and higher market depth.
- **Italy and Spain:** While foreign holdings are significant, they rely more on domestic savings, banks, and households.
- For smaller AAA/AA-rated Eurozone countries (Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland), and even for some periphery countries, foreign participation is also high, reflecting niche market demand and specific investor “carry” strategies or diversification motives.

4.4 Evolution with ECB Balance Sheet Changes

The cessation of large-scale ECB government bond purchases as of 2022 (quantitative tightening) has triggered a

rebalancing, with **foreign and domestic private sectors absorbing new net issuance**. Foreign investors, in particular, have rapidly increased their net purchases as yields rose, offsetting reduced central bank demand and ensuring continued smooth functioning of the primary and secondary sovereign bond markets.

V. Market Activity Data and Secondary Market Evidence

5.1 Trading Volume, Currency, and Venue Analysis

Secondary market data provide further insight into the **global nature of the Eurozone sovereign bond market**. In 2024, out of over EUR 60 trillion equivalent in total reported sovereign bond trading volume across the EU and UK, EUR-denominated bonds accounted for at least 52%, highlighting the currency's centrality in global portfolios.

- UK-based trading venues, which serve as a principal hub for non-Euro investors, report that **more than a third of their sovereign bond trading by volume is in euro-denominated instruments**, and the average trade size for EUR bonds on UK venues exceeds EUR 7 million—higher than on continental platforms. This reflects institutional, cross-border, and often non-euro area investor activity, as UK and US dealers service global asset managers, central banks, and sovereign wealth funds trading in euro sovereigns.

5.2 Country-of-Issuer Rankings

Among issuer countries, **Italy, Germany, and France collectively account for the bulk of euro-denominated sovereign bond trading globally**. France, in particular, stands out for its large share of debt held by non-residents and the high international trade volume in its OATs.

- According to Banque de France, *over half* of French government securities are held by non-residents, more than any other major Eurozone issuer.

Germany's Bunds are the most widely used euro-denominated "safe asset" for collateral and reserve

- management, which further underlines the internationalization of these markets.
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VI. Recent Developments and Trends Since 2022/2023

6.1 Post-Pandemic Rebound in Foreign Participation

- After an initial retrenchment in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, foreign inflows into Eurozone government debt returned to strong growth in 2023 and 2024, with **foreign demand being a primary absorber of new net issuance** alongside a surge in household and retail demand in certain countries (especially Italy).
- Investment fund flows (via funds domiciled in Ireland and Luxembourg) continue to channel global savings into euro-denominated bonds.

6.2 Official Sector Adjustments

- The share of euro area government debt held by the foreign official sector (especially non-aligned central banks and SWFs) declined marginally after 2022 (by about 5% from pre-invasion levels, or EUR 35 billion), but remains well above pre-2014 levels.
- Holdings by "aligned" official sector investors (US, Western Europe) increased correspondingly, keeping total official sector foreign holdings stable.

6.3 Recent Issuance Data

- Eurozone governments have continued to tap the global investor base, raising large amounts via syndications specifically targeting international asset managers and reserve funds. Spain, Italy, and France all set record foreign allocations in recent benchmark syndications during 2024 and 2025.
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VII. Special Considerations

7.1 Non-Eurozone Countries as Eurobond Issuers and Investors

While the focus of this report is on Euro area fiscal debt, it is noteworthy that non-euro area European nations, as well as

some global sovereigns, both issue euro-denominated debt and invest in euro sovereigns:

- **Non-Eurozone member states account for over EUR 400 billion in outstanding euro-denominated government bonds as issuers**, while many are also active investors in Euro area sovereign debt for diversification, trade linkage, and reserve management purposes.
- Major non-euro European holders include Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, among others—both as “buyers” and “issuers”.

7.2 Special Purpose Entities, Financial Centres, and Data “Look Through”

Financial centres such as Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United Kingdom host large investment fund industries that both issue and hold international securities, creating challenges in accurately capturing ultimate beneficial ownership of euro-denominated sovereign bonds. The ECB and Eurostat now employ increasingly sophisticated security-by-security, fund “unwind,” and mirror data techniques to reduce statistical biases and estimate the ultimate (end-investor) exposures.

7.3 Household and Retail Holdings: An Emerging Factor

In a handful of Eurozone sovereigns (notably Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Belgium), direct household participation in government bond markets has grown since 2022, but it remains a distinctly minor factor compared to foreign investor involvement on aggregate.

VIII. Synthesis and Summary Table

The table below collates the key current data points regarding non-Eurozone foreign holdings and the structure of the Eurozone sovereign bond market as of late 2024/early 2025.

Table 3: Eurozone Sovereign Debt - Aggregate Structure of Holdings, End 2024

Investor Type	Share of Outstanding (%)	EUR Billion (approx.)	Notes/Features
Eurosystem (ECB & NCBs)	27–28	3,750	Down from peak QE share; still dominant sector
Eurozone resident banks & financials	43–45	4,850	Includes banks, insurers, pension funds, funds
Households/non-profits	4	450	Growing only in some countries
Non-Eurozone (foreign) investors*	23–25	2,650	Incl. both official & private sector
– of which: official sector	8.5	950	Central banks, SWFs
– of which: private sector	14–17	1,700	Investment funds, asset managers, institutions
Other/uncategorized	<1	~100	Margin of statistical error or residual categories
Total	100	~11,200	

Source: ECB SHS, IIP, Bundesbank, aggregated research

IX. Analytical Discussion of Table and Key Points

This structure highlights that **non-Eurozone foreign investors play an essential and enduring role in the Eurozone sovereign bond market**, holding about one quarter of all government debt, supplying liquidity and acting as a risk-buffer. The role of **foreign official holders is large**, underscoring the euro's place as a global reserve asset. There is significant **diversity by issuer**: France and Germany's market structures are far more

internationalized than those of Italy or Spain, with non-residents constituting nearly half of the creditor base in the two former cases.

The market's internationalization is made possible and visible though the extensive participation of global investment funds and is evidenced both in holdings data and in secondary market activity recorded on trading venues outside the Eurozone. Technical challenges remain in fully attributing ultimate beneficial ownership, but advances in security-level and fund-unwind methodologies have led to increasingly precise estimations.

X. Conclusion

The current state of the Eurozone sovereign debt market is defined by a **substantial, integrated, and vital participation of investors resident outside the Euro area**. As of late 2024/early 2025, about 23–25% of euro area government debt is held by non-euro area investors, with official sector (reserves/SWFs/IOs) making up about a third of this fraction and private financial institutions (funds, asset managers, banks) the rest. Foreign holdings are especially pronounced for France and Germany and are less significant, although still consequential, for Italy and Spain. International investment is funneled via traditional and fund-based channels, including through major financial centres and special purpose vehicles, reflecting the global demand for euro-denominated safe assets and liquid sovereign debt.

This cross-border, cross-currency dynamic ensures that **Euro area government bonds remain woven into the fabric of global finance**, affecting liquidity, pricing, and financial stability well beyond Europe's borders. The consistent engagement of non-euro area investors confirms the euro's role as the world's second principal reserve and investment currency—grounded in the euro area's economic weight, stable institutions, and ever-evolving financial infrastructure.

All data, statements, and breakdowns in this report reflect factual, present-tense evidence from the primary sources available as of Q4 2024–Q1 2025 and are based on the most recent official statistics, avoiding any forward-looking considerations.

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